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Efficient local strategies for vaccination and network attack
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We study how a fraction of a population should be vaccinated to most efficiently stop epidemics. We argue that
only local information (about the neighborhood of specific vertices) is usable in practice, and hence we consider
only local vaccination strategies. The efficiency of the vaccination strategies is investigated with both static and
dynamical measures. Among other things we find that the most efficient strategy for many real-world situations
is to iteratively vaccinate the neighbor of the previous vaccinee that has most links out of the neighborhood.
PACS numbers: 89.65.–s, 89.75.Hc, 89.75.–k
I. INTRODUCTION
Diseases spread over networks. The spreading dynamics
are closely related to the structure of networks. For this rea-
son network epidemiology has turned into of the most vibrant
subdisciplines of complex network studies. (6; 11; 14) A topic
of great practical importance within network epidemiology is
the vaccination problem: How should a population be vac-
cinated to most efficiently prevent a disease to turn into an
epidemic? For economic reasons it is often not possible to
vaccinate the whole population. Some vaccines have severe
side effects and for this reason one may also want to keep
number of vaccinated individuals low. So if cheap vaccines,
free of side effects, does not exist; then having an efficient
vaccination strategy is essential for saving both money and
life. If all ties within the population is known, then the tar-
get persons for vaccination can be identified using sophisti-
cated global strategies (cf. (9)); but this is hardly possible for
nation-wide (or larger) vaccination campaigns. In a seminal
paper Cohen et al. (4) suggested a vaccination strategy that
only requires a person to estimate which other persons he, or
she, gets close enough to for the disease to spread to—i.e., to
name the “neighbors” in the network over which the disease
spreads. For network with a skewed distribution of degree
(number of neighbors) the strategy to vaccinate a neighbor of
a randomly chosen person is much more efficient than a ran-
dom vaccination. In this work we assume that each individual
knows a little bit more about his, or her, neighborhood than
just the names of the neighbors: We also assume that an in-
dividual can guess the degree of the neighbors and the ties
from one neighbor to another. This assumption is not very
unrealistic—people are believed to have a good understand-
ing of their social surroundings (this is, for example, part of
the explanation for the “navigability” of social networks) (15).
Finding the optimal set of vaccinees is closely related to the
attack vulnerability problem (1; 9). The major difference is
the dynamic system that is confined to the network—disease
spreading for the vaccination problem and information flow
for the attack vulnerability problem. To be able to protect the
network efficiently one needs to know the worst case attacking
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scenario. Large scale network attacks are, presumably, based
on local (rather than global) network information. So, a grave
scenario would be in the network was attacked with the same
strategy that is most efficient for vaccination. We will use the
vaccination problem as the framework for our discussion, but
the results applies for network attack as well.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In our discussion we will use two measures of network
structure: The clustering coefficient C of the network defined
as the ratio of triangles with respect to connected triples nor-
malized to the interval [0, 1]. (3) If C = 1 there is a maximal
number of triangles (given a set of connected triples); if C = 0
the graph has no triangles. We also measure the degree-degree
correlations through the assortative mixing coefficient defined
as (13)
r =
4〈k1 k2〉 − 〈k1 + k2〉2
2〈k21 + k
2
2〉 − 〈k1 + k2〉2
, (1)
where ki is the degree of the i’th argument of an edge in a
list of the edges, and 〈 · 〉 denotes average over that edge-list.
We let N denote the number of vertices and M the number of
edges.
III. THE NETWORKS
We will test the vaccination strategies we propose on both
real-world and model networks. The first real-world network
is a scientific collaboration network (12). The vertices of this
network are scientists who have uploaded manuscripts to the
preprint repository arxiv.org. An edge between two authors
means that they have coauthored a preprint. We also study
two small real-world social networks: One constructed from
an observational study of friendships in a karate club, another
based on an interview survey among prisoners. The edges of
these small networks are, probably, more relevant for disease
spreading than the arxiv network, but may suffer from finite
size effects. The three model networks are: 1. The Holme-
Kim (HK) model (8) that produces networks with a power-
law degree distribution and tunable clustering. Basically, it is
2TABLE I Statistics of the networks. Note that the arxiv, prison and
seceder model networks are not connected—the largest connected
components contains 48561, 58 and 2162(1) nodes respectively.
network N M C r
arxiv 58342 294901 0.420 +0.324
karate club 34 78 0.256 –0.476
prison 67 85 0.310 +0.161
HK 2000 4000 0.1753(1) –0.0458(1)
seceder 2200 6600 0.266(1) +0.012(2)
WS 2000 4000 0.4219(1) –0.01267(2)
a Baraba´si-Albert (BA) type growth model based on preferen-
tial attachment (2)—just as the BA model it has one parameter
m = M/N controlling the average degree and one (additional)
parameter mt ∈ [1, m] controlling the clustering. We will use
M = 2N = 4000 and m = mt + 1 = 4 giving the maximal
clustering for the given N and M. 2. The networked seceder
model, modeling social networks with a community structure
and exponentially decaying degree distributions (7). Briefly,
it works by sequentially updating the vertices by, for each ver-
tex v, rewiring all v’s edges to the neighborhood of a periph-
eral vertex. With a probability r an edge of v can be rewired
to a random vertex (so r controls the degree of community
structure). We use the parameter values M = 3N = 6600,
r = 0.1 and 10M iterations on an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network (5).
3. The Watts-Strogatz (WS) model (16) generates networks
with exponentially decaying degree distributions and tunable
clustering. The WS model starts from the vertices on a cir-
cular topology with edges between vertices separated by 1 to
k steps on the circle. Then one goes through the edges and
rewire one side of them to randomly selected vertices with a
probability P. We use P = 0.05 and M = kN = 2N = 4000.
IV. THE STRATEGIES
Now we turn to the definition of the strategies. We assume
a fraction f of the population is to be vaccinated. As a ref-
erence we consider random vaccination (R, equivalent to
site percolation). We use the above mentioned neighbor vac-
cination (RN)—to vaccinate the neighbor of randomly cho-
sen vertices—and the trivial improvement (10) if knowledge
about the neighbors’ degrees are included: Pick a vertex at
random and vaccinate one (randomly chosen) of its highest-
degree neighbors (we call it D). To avoid overvaccination
of a neighborhood one can consider to vaccinate neighbors of
a vertex v with a maximal number of edges out of v’s neigh-
borhood (O). For all strategies except R we also consider
“chained” versions were one, instead of vaccinating a neigh-
bor of a randomly chosen vertex, vaccinates a neighbor of the
vertex vaccinated in the previous time step (if all neighbors
are vaccinated a neighbor of a random vertex is chosen in-
stead). For the acronyms of the chained versions a suffix “C”
is added.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The results of this paper are presented in three sections:
First we study how the number of vertices in the largest con-
nected subgraph S 1 depends on the fraction f of vaccinated
vertices. Then we show that the conclusions from S 1 also hold
for dynamical simulations of disease spreading. To interpret
the results we also investigate S 1 for a fixed f as a function of
the clustering and assortative mixing coefficients.
A. Static efficiency
As a static efficiency measure we consider the size of the
average largest connected component of susceptible (non-
vaccinated) vertices, S 1. We average over nvac = 1000 runs
of the vaccination procedures. The model networks are also
averaged over nnet = 100 network realizations. (Smaller or
larger nvac and nnet does not make any qualitative difference.)
In Fig. 1 we display S 1 as a function of f . For all except the
WS model network the D and O (chained and unchained
versions) form the most efficient set of strategies. Within this
group the order of efficiency varies: For the arxiv network
the O strategy is more than twice as efficient as any other
for 0.25 . f . 0.4. For the HK and seceder model net-
works the chained strategies are considerably more efficient
than the unchained ones. We note that the difference between
the chained and unchained versions of O and D is bigger
than between O and D (or OC and DC). O do con-
verge to D in the limit of vanishing C but all networks we
test have rather high clustering. Another interesting observa-
tion is that even if the degree distribution is narrow, such as
for the seceder model of Fig. 1(e) (where P(k) ∼ exp(−k)) the
more elaborate strategies are much more efficient than random
vaccination. This is especially clear for higher f which sug-
gests that the structural change of the network of susceptible
vertices during the vaccination procedure is an important fac-
tor for the overall efficiency. For the WS model network the
chained algorithms are performing poorer than random vacci-
nation. This is in contrast to all other networks. We conclude
that epidemiology related results regarding the WS model net-
works should be cautiously generalized to real-world systems.
B. Dynamic efficiency
Static measures of vaccination efficiency are potential over-
simplifications—there is a chance that the interplay between
disease dynamics and the underlying network structure has a
significant role. To motivate the use of S 1 we also investigate
the SIS and SIR models (6) on vaccinated networks. In the
SIS model a vertex goes from “susceptible” (S) to “infected”
(I) and back to S. In the SIR model is just the same, except that
an infected vertex goes to the “removed” (R) state and remain
there. The probability to go from S to I (per contact) is zero
for vaccinated vertices and λ = 0.05 for the rest. The I state
lasts δ = 2.5 time steps. We use synchronous updating and
one randomly chosen initially infected person. The disease
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FIG. 1 The size of the largest connected component S 1 as a function of the fraction of vaccinated vertices for the (a) arxiv, (b) karate club,
(c) prison, (d) HK model, (e) seceder model and (f) WS model network. Error bars are smaller than the symbol size. Lines are guides for the
eyes.
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FIG. 2 The average number of vertices that are at infected once or
more during an outbreak s for (a) the SIR and (b) the SIS disease
dynamics. Error bars of the order of the symbol size. Lines are
guides for the eyes.
dynamics are averaged ndis = 100 times for all nvac = 1000
runs of the vaccination schemes. In Fig. 2(a) we plot the aver-
age number of individuals that at least once have been infected
during an outbreak s—i.e., until there are no I-vertices left, or
(for SIS) has reached an endemic state (defined in the simu-
lations as when there are no susceptible vertices that have not
had the disease at least once)—for the arxiv network. Other
networks and simulation parameters give qualitatively simi-
lar results. Qualitatively, the large picture from the S 1 cal-
culations remains—the chained and unchained D and O
strategies are very efficient, and the chained versions are more
efficient than the unchained. A difference is that the unchained
RN also performs rather well. Quantitatively, the differences
between the strategies are huge, this is a result of the threshold
behaviors of the SIS and SIR models (4). The conclusion of
Fig. 2 (and similar plots for other networks) is that the order of
the strategies’ efficiencies are largely the same as concluded
from the S 1( f )-curves. But if high resolution is required, the
measurement of network fragility has to be specific for the
studied system.
C. The role of clustering and assortative mixing
To gain some insight how the network structure govern the
relative efficiencies of the strategies we measure S 1( f = 0.2)
for varying assortative mixing and clustering coefficients. The
results hold for other small f values. We keep the size and de-
gree sequence constant to the values of the arxiv network. To
perform this sampling we rewire pairs of edges (v1, v2) and
(w1, w2) to (v1, w2) and (w1, v2) (unless this would introduce
a self-edge or multiple edges). To ensure that the nrew = 100
rewiring realizations are independent we start with rewiring
ninit = 3M pairs of edges. Then we go through pairs of edges
randomly and execute only changes that makes the current
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FIG. 3 How the size of the largest connected component vaccination
of 20% of the population depends on clustering and degree-degree
correlations. (a) shows S 1( f = 0.2) plotted against r. (b) shows
S 1( f = 0.2) as a function of C. The networks have the same size and
degree sequence as the arxiv network. Error bars are smaller than the
symbol size. Lines are guides for the eyes.
r or C closer to their target values. When the value of r or
C are within 0.1% of the target value the iteration is braked.
The results seen in Fig. 3 shows that, just as before the O
and D strategies, chained or unchained, are most efficient
throughout the parameter space. The unchained versions are
most efficient for r & 0.3. An explanation is that, for high r,
the chained versions will effectively only vaccinate the high-
connected vertices (that are grouped together for very high
r) and leave chains of low-degree vertices unvaccinated. The
C-dependence plotted in Fig. 3(b) shows that the unchained
versions outperform the chained versions for C & 0.15. This
is possibly a result of that the chains, for combinatorial rea-
sons, get stuck in one part of the network. It is not an ef-
fect of biased degree-degree correlations since if the rewiring
procedure is conditioned to a fixed r Fig. 3(b) remains essen-
tially unaltered. We note that the structure of the original arxiv
network differs from the rewired networks. For example, at
f = 0.2 of Fig. 1(a) the O is 22% more efficient than OC,
but in Fig. 3 the O and OC curves differ very little. For the
RN strategy the chained version is better than the unchained
throughout the range of r and C values.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
To summarize, we have investigated strategies for vaccina-
tion and network attack that are based only on the knowledge
of the neighborhood—information that humans arguably pos-
sess and utilize. Both static and dynamical measures of effi-
ciency are studied. For most networks, regardless of the num-
ber of vaccinated vertices, the most efficient strategies are to
choose a vertex v and vaccinate a neighbor of v with high-
est degree (D), or the neighbor of v with most links out of
v’s neighborhood (O). v can be picked either as the lastly
vaccinated vertex (chained selection) or at random (unchained
selection). For real-world networks the chained versions tend
to outperform the unchained ones, whereas this situation is
reversed for the three types of model networks we study. We
investigate the relative efficiency of chained and unchained
strategies further by sampling random networks with a fixed
degree sequence and varying assortative mixing and cluster-
ing coefficients. We find that the unchained strategies are
preferable for networks with a very high clustering or strong
positive assortative mixing (larger values than in seen in real-
world networks). In Ref. (4) the authors propose the strategy
to vaccinate a random neighbor of a randomly selected vertex.
This strategy (RN) requires less information of the neighbor-
hood than D and O do. Thus the practical procedure gets
simpler: One only has to ask a person “name a person you
meet regularly” rather than “name the acquaintance of yours
who meet most people you are not acquainted with regularly”
(for O). (“Meet with regularly” should be replaced with
some phrase signifying a high risk of infection transfer for the
pathogen in question.) On the other hand, if the information
of the neighborhoods is incomplete D and O will, effec-
tively, be reduced to RN (and thus not perform worse than
RN). To epitomize, choosing the people to vaccinate in the
right way will save a tremendous amount of vaccine and side-
effect cases. The best strategy can only be selected by consid-
ering both the structure of the network the pathogen spreads
over, and the disease dynamics. If nothing of this is known
the OC strategy our recommendation—it is better, or not
much worse, than the best strategy in most cases. Together
with DC, OC is most efficient for low clustering and as-
sortative mixing coefficients, which is the region of parameter
space for sexually transmitted diseases—the most interesting
case for network based vaccination schemes (due to the well-
definedness of sexual networks).
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